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Modelling bounded rationality in organizations:  
Progress and Prospects 
Phanish Puranam, Nils Stieglitz, Magda Osman, Madan M. Pillutla 
 
 
Abstract: 
Much of the formal modelling work in the organizational sciences relies on Herbert 
Simon's conception of bounded rationality, and it stakes a claim to drawing on 
behaviorally plausible assumptions about human behavior and action in organizations. 
The objectives of our review are three-fold. First, we summarize the formal literature 
by "model families" - classes of models sharing the same analytical structure- to 
highlight sharply the behavioral assumptions being made. Specifically, we discuss 
model families involving a) adaptation through search and learning by individual 
agents, b) mutual adjustment of interacting agents, and c) information aggregation in 
organizational decision-making. Second, we examine to what the extent these models 
of bounded rationality in organizations are in fact consistent with the behavioral 
evidence in psychology and other related fields. Finally, we discuss opportunities for 
further research that strengthens the links between formal modelling in organizations 
research, and its behavioral foundations. In particular we highlight the promise of 
experimental methods that translate organizational models to multiple-subject 
experiments in the behavioral laboratory. 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
An early draft of this article was prepared as a background note for a workshop on “The 
psychological foundations of organizational models” held at London Business School, May 
11-12, 2012. We also thank Felipe Csaszar, Jerker Denrell, Dan Levinthal, and Thorbjørn 
Knudsen for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. All remaining errors are ours. 
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1. Introduction 
The work of Herbert Simon (1916-2001), his colleagues and others inspired by his vision of 
constructing a science of organization has always had a strong component of formal 
(mathematical and computational) modelling (e.g. Simon, 1955; Cyert and March, 1963). 
Formal models allow for a precise statement of assumptions in a manner that makes them 
transparent, and allows for an examination of the possibly surprising ways in which a system 
characterized by these assumptions behaves over time. Verbal theorizing does not offer either 
this precision or insight into dynamics, unless practiced by an extraordinarily gifted theorist 
(Lave and March, 1975; Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al. 2007; Adner et al., 2009).  
 
The tradition of modelling behavior in and of organizations inspired by Simon and his 
colleagues stands in contrast to other forms of modelling in the social sciences primarily 
because of the centrality of the notions of bounded rationality.  
Simon’s (1955) notion of bounded rationality  assumed that 1) the decision making process 
begins with the  search for alternatives 2) the decision maker has egregiously incomplete and 
inaccurate knowledge about the consequences of actions, and  3) she chooses actions that are 
expected to be satisficing (attain targets while satisfying  constraints). Later work by Cyert 
and March (1963) added an important elaboration - problemistic search- which indicates that 
the search process described above is itself triggered by a failure to meet aspiration levels (see 
also recent overviews by Gavetti et al (2007; 2012) of the tradition of research inspired by 
Simon). We will refer to this form of bounded rationality, to paraphrase Simon, as a form of 
“adaptive rationality” as it emphasizes the process of searching for better alternatives by 
reacting to feedback (e.g. Simon, 1996). 
1
 
                                  
1
 Simon’s conception of  global rationality was as follows (Simon, 1997:25) :“This is what I call full or 
global rationality: people are making their decisions to maximize utility in a world which they either 
understand exactly or in terms of a known probability distribution (i.e. they are maximizing subjective 
expected utility).” Since bounded rationality is defined by its departure from global rationality, it 
follows that there are many possible ways in which rationality can be bounded. There is, of course, a 
significant body of modelling work with some form of bounded rationality in economics; see for 
instance Rubinstein (1998) or Spiegler (2011), as well as an extensive empirical tradition (e.g. 
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Simon’s intention was to theorize about and to model organizations in a manner that took 
account of the nature of the human agents who constituted them. Specifically, if human 
agents are best characterized as being bounded, rather than globally rational when confronted 
with typical problems in organizational settings, then we should model organizations with 
these ‘correct’ behavioral assumptions since organizations are aggregations of these human 
agents. It is not the purpose of this essay to review the evidence for the proposition that 
individuals are boundedly rather than unlimitedly rational, which we take as granted.
2
 Instead, 
our focus is on investigating whether models of organizations that assume boundedly rational 
agents make psychologically ‘correct’ assumptions about humans-in other words to assess 
their behavioral plausibility.  
 
Since Cyert and March (1963), about a 100 papers invoking models of bounded, adaptively 
rational behavior in and by organizations have been published in the leading outlets for 
research about organization and management theory. A common feature of these papers is 
their explicit declaration of building on behaviorally plausible models of human action- i.e. on 
realistic assumptions about human behavior in organizations. A few have achieved canonical 
status such as the “garbage can” model of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) and March’s 
model of exploration and exploitation in organizational learning (1991). These models and 
their insights have percolated widely beyond the community of modellers in the organization 
sciences to an extent where it is no longer necessary to make them the focus of review articles 
                                                                                               
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Camerer, 2003). In this literature, bounded rationality is conceptualized 
variously in terms of the existence of communication and search costs, malleable and unstable 
preferences, or outright processing errors (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 
2001), while the modelling typically retains the notion of optimization subject to these features. 
 
2
 The statement by Schoemaker (1982) in his review of the evidence on expected utility (EU) 
maximization remains a good summary: “For well-structured repetitive tasks, with important stakes, 
and well-trained decision makers, EU maximization may well describe the actual decision process.”  
In other words unbounded rational choice may be a useful theory when there is a small or well-known 
space of choices, (expected) utilities associated with the choices have been discovered and are now 
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such as this one (there is an excellent one by Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio (2012) in 
this very journal for those interested in the research inspired by these classic models from the 
Carnegie tradition). Rather, our objective in this essay is to do three things not undertaken so 
far:  
 
First, as noted, we wish to examine the growing body of modelling work based on adaptive 
rationality in order to examine to what extent these models of organizations are in fact 
consistent in their assumptions about behavior with the available scientific evidence. If this 
consistency is a central claim for the distinctiveness of modelling by organization and 
management theorists, then it would be good for the field to explicitly evaluate the strength of 
these claims. Drawing on assumptions about human behavior that are better grounded in 
psychology than traditional rational choice models is an appealing feature of these models for 
management and organizations researchers that sometimes remains obscured behind the 
technical details of the models. By exposing this, we aim to increase the appreciation for 
formal models among organizations researchers, which as Adner et al. (2009) point out is still 
fairly limited. 
   
Second, we will systematically summarize this body of work by “model families” - classes of 
models that share an underlying analytical structure, with a distinctive set of assumptions and 
mechanisms, and resulting insights. Specifically, we discuss model families which examine a) 
individual agent adaptation through search and learning, b) mutual adjustment of an 
organization’s constituent agents and c) information aggregation. Such an exercise we believe 
has enormous instructional value for modellers as well as organizations researchers in general, 
by making transparent underlying assumptions, as well as the kinds of problems to which the 
models may bring insight, and finally by suggesting avenues for empirical research. 
                                                                                               
well known, and there is sufficient difference between the outcomes of choices to make maximization 
easy. Such situations, Simon argued, are rare within organizations.  
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Third, we discuss opportunities for further research that strengthen the links between formal 
modelling in organizations research, and its behavioral foundations. Surprisingly, direct tests 
of the empirical predictions of organizational models of adaptive rationality have been rare, 
with these models more often being treated as metaphors that shed light on how previously 
known mechanisms might interact in surprising ways. While this is valuable, what makes 
models most useful is their ability to predict. Beyond the usual empirical approaches 
management researchers favour (e.g. large sample archival data analysis, surveys, case 
studies), in our view, there is also an opportunity to use experimental methods to test model 
predictions.  These experiments could translate agent-based models to multiple-subject 
experiments in the behavioral lab as a methodology to test the predictions. Pragmatically, 
since both modeling and experimental work deal with interaction structures among a small 
number of agents, the possibilities for theory building, calibration and theory testing are 
numerous at their interface. Empiricists may benefit from sharper statements of hypotheses 
that model based predictions can generate, while modelers may benefit from the data that 
empiricists gather that can help falsify current models and force them to improve in their 
veridicality and usefulness.  
 
Thus, at a broader level, our goal in this article is to bridge the chasm between empirical 
researchers (including experimentalists) and theoretical researchers in order to help stimulate 
the production of scientific (i.e. behaviorally grounded) models in organization and 
management theory. Our efforts are guided by the words of the Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith 
(1982: 924) who argued that ‘theory should be ever more demanding of our empirical 
resources. Simultaneously, data should be ever more demanding of the empirical relevance of 
theory and of the theorist's expertise in working imaginatively on problems of the world, 
rather than on stylized problems of the imagination’. The modeling work on adaptive 
rationality fulfills Vernon Smith’s criterion of theory that captures problems of the world as 
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its avowed purpose is to model the important problem of ‘organizing.’  It is therefore 
deserving of empirical testing and we hope that our paper stimulates that. 
 
The rest of this this article is organized as follows: in section 2, we describe the common 
building blocks that are present in all models of bounded adaptive rationality. Section 3 is the 
heart of the paper, and examines each of three important model families that appear often in 
organizations research- models of individual adaptation, mutual adjustment, and information 
aggregation.  For each model family, we describe the model’s structure, discuss the extent to 
which the assumptions of the model have sound foundations in the evidence about how 
individuals and groups behave, and then state the key insights emerging from the model. We 
highlight the core results that emerge for each model family rather than review the specific 
results that are derived in each paper within this literature; this is because the results in 
particular papers point to “moderators” that weaken or strengthen the effects underlying core 
results. This aggregation into model families also implies that we are unable to do justice to 
every influential model (e.g. Carley, 1992; Prietula, Carley, Glasser, 1998; Davis, Eisenhardt, 
Bingham, 2009), as we pick those which have underlying platforms that are shared across 
multiple papers and authors. Finally, section 4 concludes with a discussion of future research 
opportunities.  
 
To preview the fruits of this review, (which are discussed more fully in the last section), we a) 
identify the four key behavioral assumptions that underlie the models we have reviewed, 
namely exploratory choice, learning through reinforcement, search  through local hill 
climbing, and problemistic search, and verify whether these assumptions have an empirical 
basis b) discuss testable implications from these models that have not so far been examined 
by empirical researchers, and provide a useful mapping between model parameters and 
empirically observable data in Table 1, and c) discuss the possibilities of using behavioral 
laboratory experiments to test models of adaptive rationality.     
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2. Basic elements of a model of bounded adaptive rationality  
Before moving to a discussion of different model families, we briefly describe the 
foundational elements of models of boundedly adaptive rational behavior.   
 
1.  Task Environment   
This describes an objective reality which can be characterized with respect to an agent in 
terms of a set of possible Actions }....,{ 21 mAAA  which map into Performance outcomes 
}....,{ 21 mΠΠΠ  for the agent. The task environment need not be stable; it could contain 
other agents, whose behavior may itself contribute to the instability of the task environment. 
Implicitly, given a task environment, the objective of the agent in an adaptive rationality 
model is to take actions that yield a level of performance deemed acceptable (often termed the 
aspiration level).  Task environments thus capture a mapping between the possible courses of 
action available to an agent, and the likelihood of attaining the desired goal of the agent for 
each course of action. Task environments are tied to particular goals; a change in goals will 
imply a change in task environments.   
 
2. A Representation of the Task Environment  
An agent at any point in time may have beliefs (not necessarily knowledge) of the Task 
Environment, in terms of two things:  
i. a set of feasible actions }....,{ ,,2,1 tmtt aaa ,  
ii. and the associated set of performance outcomes }....,{ ,,2,1 tmtt πππ . 
 
3. A Choice process given the Representation 
This is a procedure by which the agent chooses an action within his Representation.  
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These three elements of a model of boundedly rational behavior correspond to the three 
hierarchically linked components that have been used to characterize behavior in 
classical organization theory (e.g. Simon, 1946; Cyert and March, 1963): Goals 
(operationalized through the task environment), Representations and Choice processes. 
Interestingly, these elements are present in rational choice models as well.  The difference 
is that the task environment in a rational choice model is typically assumed to be known 
perfectly to the agent so that representation and task environment are identical (or at least the 
former is a known and unbiased probability distribution over the latter), and the choice 
process is the maximization of subjective expected utility. To make the modelling of the 
choice process mathematically tractable, it is also common in many such models to assume 
certain mathematical properties of the task environment that make it easy to apply standard 
techniques to find the best action.  
 
Bounded adaptive rationality models are different. The first (and in our view both necessary 
and sufficient) point of distinctiveness for such models is that the representation is incomplete 
and/or incorrect in terms of the set of possible actions as well as their associated outcomes. 
The agent ‘has egregiously incomplete and inaccurate knowledge about the consequences of 
actions’, to paraphrase Simon. Thus at any point in time, the agents Representation of actions 
}....,{ ,,2,1 tktt aaa  may contain only a small subset of actions from }....,{ 21 mAAA  (i.e they 
have a “coarse” representation), and the beliefs about associated outcomes }....,{ ,,2,1 tktt πππ  
may be incomplete, inaccurate or both with respect to the actual values of outcomes in the 
Task Environment }....,{ 21 mΠΠΠ .  
 
A second point of departure (which, in our view is sufficient but not necessary to make it a 
model of bounded rationality) is that the Choice process may not involve maximization even 
within the representation.  More specifically, alternatives to maximization include the notion 
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of “non-greedy” or exploratory choice (Sutton and Barto, 1998), whereby an agent may with 
some probability select an action other than the one that is associated in the Representation 
with the best outcome. A related concept is “satisficing” which involves making a choice 
relative to an aspirational level (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003), rather than pursuing a 
course of action aimed at the best possible outcome.  
 
4. Critical to a model of bounded but adaptive rationality is a Transformation procedure that 
modifies Representations and possibly Choice processes over time. The transformation 
process may be a consequence of communication with other agents, a process of learning- a 
change in beliefs as a consequence of experience- or indeed random fluctuations in beliefs. 
The process of Transformation may itself be triggered by the consequences of the Choice 
process, in the form of feedback from the Task Environment- the realized outcome. It may 
affect not only Representations but also Choice processes by changing aspiration levels. 
There is usually at least a tendency for the Transformation process in models of adaptive 
rationality to move Representations towards alignment with Task Environments, but this can 
take time, and is seldom either complete or comprehensive.3  
 
Thus the typical structure of an adaptive rationality model involves some or all of the 
following (possibly) recursive sequence:  
1. Agent has (initial) Representation of the Task Environment. 
2. Agent selects an action through a Choice process. 
3. Feedback is generated from the consequences of the agents action in the Task 
Environment. 
                                  
3
 A process of Selection (through competition) sometimes accompanies organizational models of 
adaptive rationality (e.g. Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal and Posen, 2007), and may be an alternative (or 
addition) to the Transformation process in terms of generating change over time. Put simply, the 
individual agents in the model may change their representations through Transformation processes, or 
the distribution of representations in the population may change through Selecting out those agents 
who have poor representations, or both. Since selection through competition does not feature in all 
models of adaptive rationality, we only discuss it when relevant.  
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4. A Transformation process of the Representation and possibly Choice process is 
triggered by the feedback. 
5. (Step 1 repeats). 
 
As should be clear, our focus is on models that not only feature bounded rationality (i.e., in 
which agent’s representations are imperfect) but are also adaptive (i.e. there is a 
transformation process that modified representations over time).4  
 
Adaptively rational models of organizations vary in whether they model organizations as 
‘unitary’ actors5 or as interacting agents whose sometimes conflicting preferences, beliefs and 
choice procedures cannot be captured conveniently in aggregate form as if they relate to a 
single agent. This suggests that we must consider two approaches to assessing behavioral 
plausibility.  First, to what extent do unitary actor models of organizations embody 
assumptions about their adaptive rationality that are consistent with how groups and 
organizations as aggregations act?  Specifically, there is much research in social psychology 
and organizational behavior about how and when groups and other collectives act (as an 
aggregate), and indeed act differently compared to individual actors in similar situations.  We 
use that research as the basis to verify the validity of the behavioral assumptions of models of 
adaptive rationality that employ unitary actor assumptions.  The second approach to assessing 
behavioral plausibility is to see how multi-agent models of organizations embody 
assumptions about the agents’ adaptive rationality that are consistent with how individuals act. 
                                                                                               
 
4
 Models with the first feature but not the second also exist in the organizational literature, and often 
invoke maximization within an imperfect representation (e.g. Siggelkow, 2002; Kretschmer and 
Puranam, 2008; Puranam and Vanneste, 2009; Gulati and Puranam, 2009).  Since there is considerable 
variation in the nature of the Task Environments and Representations in these papers, we do not 
attempt to summarize these here.   
5
 The unitary actor assumption can be justified if there are rules of preference/belief aggregation, and 
selection into or out of an organization does not destabilize such processes; if an organization is 
effectively controlled by a powerful individual, or a governing coalition which has stable preferences, 
beliefs and choice procedures (see for instance Hug (1999) for a formal analysis of the conditions 
under which unitary actor assumptions may be more or less plausible).  
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3. Families of organizational models of adaptive rationality 
We summarize the modelling literature on adaptive bounded rationality in organizations in 
terms of three main model families. The first, featuring models of individual agent adaptation, 
provides some or all of the building blocks for the second (mutual adaptation) and third 
(information aggregation). The literature is also most extensively developed around the first. 
Accordingly, the coverage of models of individual agent adaptation – particularly in terms of 
a discussion of their behavioral plausibility- is more extensive in this review than of the other 
two model families. It is our hope that the field will develop in a way that allows future 
reviews, such as this one, to give more coverage to the second and third families of models, 
which are very relevant to issues of aggregation in organizations.  
 
For each of the models that we present, we begin with some information about the conceptual 
background of the model and, present its core elements (task environment, representation, 
choice, transformation of representation) to identify the behavioral assumptions made in the 
model.  We then examine the behavioral plausibility of core assumptions and move on to 
discussing the key insights from the model. 
 
A. Models of Individual Agent Adaptation 
Since the discovery of superior (to status quo) alternatives through an adaptation process is 
the essence of adaptive rationality, we begin with a look at models of individual agent 
adaptation. We focus on models in which decision-making by an agent plays an explicit and 
central role in the model. Two important sub-classes of organizational models are considered 
within this family. The multi-armed bandit depicts learning and decision-making under 
uncertainty (and models organizational problems such as  resource allocation, including but 
not restricted to making decisions about different investment opportunities, allocation of 
resources to different divisions of a company, etc.), while the NK model examines adaptation 
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in complex task environments that feature interdependencies between choices (capturing 
organizational problems such as the formulation of new business models, adoption of 
manufacturing or human resource policies with unknown interactions between them).   
 
a. Reinforcement learning in multi-armed bandit models  
This model takes its name from the slot machines in gambling establishments (Brand, Wood, 
& Sakoda, 1956; Brand, Sakoda, & Woods, 1957). Metaphorically, the model describes a 
gambler who faces a slot machine with multiple alternative arms, each with an unknown 
payoff distribution. The gambler has a fixed budget and intends to make as much money as 
possible over multiple trials. She learns about the payoff distributions associated with an arm 
by selecting it and observing the realized payoff. Obviously, the gambler always wants to 
select the alternative with the highest expected payoff, but the problem is that she does not 
initially know the expected payoffs for each arm, and can only learn them by actually trying 
each of the multiple arms. Thus the gambler’s behavior is a process of repeated trials, 
followed by learning from the outcome of each trial.   
 
Lave and March (1975) and March (1996) introduced the bandit formulation to organizations 
researchers; subsequent formal papers include Denrell and March (2001), Posen and 
Levinthal (2012), Stieglitz, Knudsen, and Becker (2014), Puranam and Swamy (Forthcoming) 
and Lee and Puranam (Forthcoming).  
 
Modellers in the adaptive rationality tradition have made use of the multi-arm bandit’s strong 
structural similarity to resource allocation processes in organizations: the model describes 
with reasonable fidelity a decision maker who aims to maximize returns from her investments, 
and is confronted with multiple alternatives with unknown performance consequences.  The 
relative attractiveness of these alternatives can only be gauged by actually trying them (i.e., 
making some investments) and observing and interpreting the resulting feedback. The goal is 
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to discover the alternative with the best returns as quickly as possible. In an organizational 
context, the uncertain investment alternatives could, for example, represent different 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Gruber et al., 2008), different 
divisions in a multi-product firm (Noda and Bower, 1996), or different research projects 
(Loch and Kavadias, 2002). 
 
 We describe in more detail below the four key elements of the multi-armed bandit model 
before examining the behavioral plausibility of core assumptions and the key insights from 
the model.  
 
1. Task Environment 
The task environment in a bandit model consists of a set of ‘m’ discrete alternatives, each 
representing a possible course of action with distinct payoff consequences. Each alternative is 
associated with a unique payoff distribution (whose properties are unknown to the agent). 
This a) creates performance differences among alternatives and b) makes performance 
feedback noisy and potentially misleading. False negatives may arise – a good alternative 
looks bad because of an atypical unlucky draw from its payoff distribution, as can false 
positives – a bad alternative may look good because of an atypical lucky draw from its payoff 
distribution.
6
 
 
To illustrate these ideas, consider a bandit with m=2, with alternatives A and B. A simple 
everyday example is finding a good place to eat, with A and B representing two restaurants. 
One alternative is in an objective sense superior for the decision-maker: alternative A 
                                  
6
 The basic bandit setup usually assumes a stable task environment, i.e., the probability distribution of 
payoffs for each arm is fixed. However, the model can be easily amended to also consider dynamic task 
environments where the probability distributions fluctuate over time to depict changing markets or 
technological conditions for the opportunities that each alternative represents (Posen and Levinthal, 
2012, Stieglitz et al., 2014). Similarly, competence development and lock-in to particular alternatives 
may be represented by making the probability distribution conditional on the number of times an 
alternative has been chosen (Denrell and March, 2001).  
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dispenses a reward (of 1) with a 0.75 probability, while alternative B only has a success rate 
of 0.5. In the restaurant example, a payoff of 1 would represent good food and a payoff of 0 -
bad food. A fully informed decision-maker would therefore always pick alternative A. The 
bandit task is trivial as long as agents have full information about the alternatives. However 
the purpose of the model is to describe the process that ensues when the knowledge about 
alternatives – the agent’s representation (i.e., in the above example, they do not know the 
probability of a reward associated with each alternative) – is far from complete initially. 
 
2. Representation:  
Commonly, in bandit models, the set of alternative actions in the agent’s representation is 
complete and correct with respect to the Task Environment, but the associated performance 
outcomes are not. This corresponds to situations where the space of alternatives is known, but 
not their value. Thus the CEO of a multi-business firm may know the number of divisions in 
the firm that need capital in the budgeting process, but not the true expected rates of return for 
investing in them. Similarly, the number and location of restaurants may be known, but not 
their quality. Instead, for each action in the agent’s representation, the agent may have at any 
point in time (possibly egregiously inaccurate) beliefs (Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2005; Posen 
and Levinthal, 2012). In the technical literature these are referred to as “action value 
estimates” (Sutton and Barto, 1998). For example, the action value estimates for alternatives 
A and B could be 0.5 and 0.66 respectively in the example above. Assumptions about these 
prior beliefs  represent the current state of knowledge of the agent, e.g., she could have heard 
from friends that restaurant B is much better than A.    
 
3. Choice process:  
Given the agent’s representation, there are broadly two kinds of choice rules: maximizing and 
probabilistic choice rules (Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2005). Maximizing choice rules assume 
that agent always picks the alternative currently associated with the highest expected payoff 
in the agent’s representation. This is also sometimes called greedy action selection (Sutton 
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and Barto, 1998). For example, an agent following a maximizing choice rule would select 
alternative B based on her priors in our example, which is the incorrect choice. In the 
literature, such a choice would be termed an exploitative one, as it picks the alternative 
considered best within the current representation. 
 
Probabilistic choice rules, in contrast, assume that choices are probabilistically determined in 
proportion to the current relative strengths of the representations. A common probabilistic 
choice rule in organizational models is the so called “softmax” action selection rule (Luce, 
1959; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Posen and Levinthal, 2012).  In this rule the probability of a 
choice k at time t depends on its relative action value estimate V in the agent’s representation 
and an exploration parameter τ.  
∑
=
=
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t
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t
tk
e
e
kp
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The parameter τ tunes the degree of exploration – the probability of choosing an alternative 
currently seen as inferior within the representation – by discounting the current 
representations. A higher τ discounts current representations more strongly and thereby 
increases the probability of selecting a (currently believed to be) inferior action. For example, 
given the (wrong) representations for A (0.5) and B (0.66), the probability of choosing B with 
a very low degree of exploration τ = 0.1 is 0.75. In contrast, with τ = 1, the probability of 
choosing B is just 0.52. Note that there is a clear benefit to exploration here, because the 
agent currently holds a flawed representation, believing wrongly that alternative B is superior.  
 
For a given task environment, Gittins and Jones (1974) formally proved the existence of an 
optimal level of exploration in the bandit problem. However, as is generally acknowledged, 
the information and computational power required to implement this optimal exploration level 
makes this intractable except under very particular assumptions (Gittins, 1979; Arthur, 1991; 
Posen and Levinthal, 2012).  Organizations research inspired by these models has tended to 
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use either constant levels of exploration, comparing across levels (in order to study the effects 
of different levels of exploration on system performance), or simple behaviorally plausible 
rules for deciding the level of exploration dynamically (in order to focus on other parameters 
of interest in the model). For instance, empirical work in the behavioral theory of the firm 
tradition argues that organizations increase exploration as a response to underperformance 
relative to an aspiration level (e.g. Greve, 2003; Hu et al., 2011). Applied to the softmax, this 
would mean that parameter τ is contingent on performance relative to aspiration, with a 
higher τ if the organization underperforms relative to its aspiration.   
 
4. Transformation process: 
Since most bandit models assume that the agent’s representation is complete in terms of the 
action space, but is incorrect ex ante in terms of the associated payoffs, the transformation 
processes of interest in such models involve how the representation of the task environment 
changes over time. Agents typically engage in reinforcement learning- whose variants are 
known under the labels of trial-and-error learning, experiential learning, operant or 
instrumental conditioning, “win-stay-lose-shift” rules in the relevant literatures in psychology, 
computer science, organization theory and evolutionary biology (Thorndike, 1911; March, 
1991; Domjan, 2010; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993; Sutton and Barto, 1998). All instantiate 
Thorndike’s Law of Effect: “Responses that produce a satisfying effect in a particular 
situation become more likely to occur again in that situation and responses that produce a 
discomforting effect become less likely to occur again in that situation.” Thorndike’s law of 
effect implies that favourable feedback tend to positively reinforce the belief about an 
alternative and thereby make its choice more likely.  
 
The most basic way to model the reinforcement learning process is a simple averaging rule, 
where the representation simply reflects the average of all payoff signals received in the past. 
For example, assume that an agent visited restaurant A four times and received the following 
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payoffs [1,0,1,0]. Taking the average leads to a belief of 0.5. Restaurant B was selected six 
times, with payoffs [1,1,1,0,0,1], so the belief in the agent’s representation is 0.66.   
 
A more general approach to agent’s reinforcement learning is based on statistical learning 
models (Bush and Mosteller, 1955; Denrell and March, 2001) that explicitly consider a 
learning rate. For example, the exponential recency weighted average rule discounts rewards 
that occurred long ago: 
 ][ 1,1,, −− −+= tmt
m
tmtm VrVV φ  
Where ]1,0[∈φ  is called the step size parameter (Sutton and Barto, 1998) and can be 
interpreted as a learning rate. The higher the parameter ϕ, the more recent rewards matter in 
the representation, and the more rapid is the updating process. For instance, assume that the 
current representation of B is 0.66 and the agent selects B and receives no payoff. With ϕ = 
0.9, the new representation is 0.066, a massive re-evaluation of the alternative. In contrast, 
with ϕ = 0.1 the new representation is 0.594, a much more modest change in representation.  
 
The bandit model can also be extended by considering competition based selection in a 
population of agents, in which the relative cumulative payoffs influence survival probability 
(Denrell and March, 2001; Stieglitz et al., 2014). Some recent organizational models have 
begun to look into a decision-making context in which actions are not followed by immediate 
feedback (Denrell, Fang & Levinthal, 2004; Rahmandad, 2008; Fang and Levinthal, 2009). 
Rather, feedback may only be available after a sequence of actions has been performed. The 
delayed feedback conditions relate to the notion of credit assignment, i.e., the problem of 
assigning payoffs to alternative actions (Fang, 2012). The modelling of learning in this 
context is also based on reinforcement learning principles in which action value estimates are 
assigned to intermediate actions.   
 
Behavioral plausibility of bandit models 
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There are two key behavioral assumptions about the agent in a bandit model: reinforcement 
learning and exploration in choice.   
 
There is an extensive body of experimental evidence documenting that reinforcement learning 
is a good model for the behavior of individual adaptation in situations where the initial 
understanding of a complex task environment is limited, (e.g. Erev and Roth, 1998;Camerer, 
2003; Domjan, 2010). The fundamental validity of the Law of Effect in such situations is 
beyond dispute (Thorndike, 1911; Domjan, 2010; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). Indeed, there 
is evidence suggesting that as the computational load of a task that an agent is performing 
increases, they are more likely to rely on reinforcement learning rather than alternative 
heuristic type strategies in choice tasks (Otto et al, 2010).  
 
Experimental evidence also suggests that the softmax choice rule – which implies explorative 
choice- is a good approximation to the neurological processes that underlie how humans 
select actions in trial and error learning situations, in that exploration occurs, and does so 
through inhibiting tendencies towards greedy (exploitative) action selection (Camerer and Ho, 
1999; Daw et al, 2006; Laureiro-Martinez, Brusoni, Canessa, & Zollo, 2014). However, the 
conditions under which people switch between exploration and exploitation are not yet fully 
understood. Some recent studies have shown that people appear to enter uncertain choice 
situations by exploring (Lea et al, 2011; Steyvers et al, 2009), and the rate of switching back 
and forth between exploration and exploitation decreases as a function of experience.  
 
Notwithstanding these broad consistencies, the parameters of the learning process, such as 
exploration and learning rates, differ significantly between people.  Recent research has 
focused attention on the sources of these differences, using psychometric measures of 
cognitive ability (Steyvers, et al, 2009), and neurological differences (Badre, Doll, Long, & 
Frank, 2012), as well as differences based on dispositions to seek or avoid novelty (Payzan-
LeNestour, & Bossaerts, 2012). These findings provide empirical opportunities as the 
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individual differences can be measured and used as proxies (for parameters of the learning 
process) to investigate whether predictions about how variations in the parameters of the 
learning process produce expected results when coupled with particular properties of the task 
environment. 
 
In many organizational applications, it is the organizational unit as a whole that is assumed to 
undertake reinforcement learning, with exploration. One way to justify this is to appeal to the 
notion of a powerful key actor as representing the organization. In this case, the results at the 
individual level can be directly used to justify the modelling assumptions.  
 
The other is to impute learning behavior to the organizational level on the basis of 
hypothesized internal dynamics such as the strengthening of coalitions, or the creation of 
routines as Cyert and March (1963), and later Nelson and Winter (1982) did. There is a 
significant body of work that indirectly documents organizational level reinforcement 
learning through the phenomenon of organizational experience curves (e.g. Argote, 2012; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002). These depict an improvement in performance with experience, but 
with the rate of increase slowing down with experience. Since this pattern of performance 
improvement with experience is a hallmark of reinforcement learning processes, the former 
provides indirect evidence for the latter.   
 
How organizations balance exploration and exploitation has also been an active area of 
research since March (1991) first introduced the trade-off to the organizational literature. 
Under the term “ambidexterity” (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013) a significant empirical 
literature now exists that includes cases as well as some large sample evidence on how 
organizations attempt to balance exploration and exploitation- leaving little doubt that the 
attempt is frequently and deliberately made, even though is not always successful (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Raisch et al., (2009), and also Gavetti et al., (2012) for a recent review of 
the literature inspired by the behavioral theory of the firm). 
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In sum, it would appear the behavioral principles that underlie multi-armed bandit models - 
such as reinforcement learning and explorative choices- rest on reasonable empirical 
foundations, whether used to model individual or organizational behavior in contexts where 
experience is necessary to generate information about the value of alternatives.  As the 
research in psychology and organizations converges towards a better understanding of when 
exploration is triggered, it may be possible to incorporate these refinements into the next 
generation of models.    
 
Key trade-offs and insights  
Having examined the behavioral plausibility of its assumptions, we now turn to the key 
underlying trade-offs and insights generated by this family of models. These insights are 
worth investigating empirically. There are two key trade-offs that arise in the bandit model. 
First, there is the canonical trade-off between exploitation of current knowledge and 
exploration of new knowledge (Holland, 1975): The agent may rely on current knowledge by 
selecting the arm known to produce a good outcome (exploitation) or choose an apparently 
inferior arm in the hope of attaining a superior outcome and thereby improving future payoffs 
(exploration). Because initial representations of agents usually do not correspond to the task 
environment there is a positive value of exploration because it prevents agents from settling 
on an inferior alternative. However, agents may also overinvest in exploration – that is, they 
direct far too much effort on choosing inferior alternatives, without experiencing substantial 
benefits that will improve their future (Fernie, & Tunney, 2006; Fridberg et al. 2010; Kjome 
et al., 2010; Premkumar et al., 2008; Steingroever et al, 2012; Wood et al., 2005).  
 
Figure 1 shows in a stylized manner the standard result on the value of exploration in a multi-
armed bandit model with a stable task environment. On the vertical axis, the performance of 
agents is reported. Note that the performance measure used here is the cumulative payoffs 
over all trials. This represents settings in which agents face persistent selection pressures 
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(Denrell and March, 2001; Levinthal and Posen, 2007). One could also simply report 
performance in the n-th trial, or the fraction of cases in which the best alternative has been 
found by trial n. The horizontal axis plots different values of the exploration parameter in the 
softmax choice rule, with low values corresponding to low levels of exploration. Figure 1 
shows that agents underinvesting in exploration suffer performance shortfalls. They do not 
explore enough and thereby settle on an inferior alternative. To pick up again on the 
restaurant example, an agent settling for the first restaurant with decent food as her favourite 
place misses out on many superior establishments. In contrast, agents with a very high 
exploration level spend too much on exploring inferior alternatives. That is, she visits and 
spends money on many bad restaurants again and again in the hope that things improve. 
Agents that strike exactly the right balance between exploration and exploitation show 
superior performance because they identify the best alternative (by providing for sufficient 
exploration) and firmly hold on to it (by providing for enough exploitation).   
 
Figure 1: The optimal balance between exploitation and exploration 
 
All models using the multi-armed bandit implicitly or explicitly feature the exploration-
exploitation trade-off, and some may explicitly examine moderators that strengthen or 
weaken the forces generating this trade-off. For instance, an important paper that has analysed 
the location of the optimal level of exploration as a function of turbulence in the task 
environment is Posen and Levinthal (2012).  They show that, optimally exploration should 
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decline as the possibility of changes to the payoff distribution for the arms in the bandit 
increases to high levels. 
 
The second trade-off has to do with the potential pitfalls of learning too rapidly in 
environments with noisy feedback (Denrell, 2007). Because feedback is noisy – payoffs are 
drawn from a probability distribution – the agent is confronted by “false-positives” and 
“false-negatives”, i.e., when the value of an action is believed to be higher than it really is and 
vice versa. Clearly some learning is better than no learning at all, but as several organizational 
models point out, rapid learning is more susceptible to superstitious learning and mistakes, in 
which the agent may , selectthe wrong alternative by learning too rapidly from false-positives 
and false-negatives. The agent can superstitiously associate purely chance outcomes with her 
own chosen actions (Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo, 2011; Lave and March, 1975). (Consider 
the proverbial “lucky socks” which get associated with positive outcomes by an individual 
who happened to wear them to many good outcome situations).   
 
Papers that have examined the consequence of this learning problem show that agents can 
learn to become risk averse over time (March 1996; Denrell and March, 2001) and thereby 
may systematically underinvest into higher-variance, more innovative outcomes.  The related 
“hot stove” effect (Denrell and March, 2001) identifies an important asymmetry between false 
positive and false negative learning: agents will stop selecting alternatives associated with 
false-negative outcomes and thereby may miss out on superior alternatives, whereas false 
positives will likely be corrected for as the falsely attractive alternative is tried again. Thus a 
bad restaurant that generates a lucky good meal (false positive) will be found out on being 
visited again, but a good restaurant that produces an unlucky bad meal (false negative), may 
never be visited again.  
 
Figure 2 shows this second trade-off in a stylized manner. The vertical axis gives the 
probability of having found the best alternative after a number of trials (obtained by 
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computing the fraction of agents in a simulation who have chosen the correct alternative), and 
the horizontal axis shows increasing rates of learning. 7 As the figure shows, in noisy 
environments, rapid learning can do worse than slower learning. 
 
 
Figure 2: Learning rates and performance in different task environments 
 
The insights from the bandit model for the designers of learning systems, including 
organizations, can be inferred from these trade-offs. The parameters of the learning process 
crucially determine success when entering poorly understood and noisy task environments. In 
particular, avoiding the extremes of very low or very high exploration, as well as very low or 
very high learning rates, can help promote valid learning and successful choice of alternatives.  
 
The trade-offs and insights generated by the multi-arm bandit problem illustrate the point we 
made at the beginning that formal models have the ability to generate systematic insight in 
ways that verbal theorizing may not be able to.  As we will note in the final section, the 
                                  
7
 A moderate level of exploration is assumed. At very high levels of exploration, the effects of learning 
are suppressed, since choices do not discriminate among alternatives, regardless of what has been 
learned about them.   
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precision of these predictions suggests the need and appropriateness of laboratory methods for 
testing them. 
 
b. Models of search on rugged landscapes  
In addition to the multi-arm bandit problem, modellers examine individual learning and 
adaptation using the so-called ‘NK’ models.  These models examine organizational decision 
making problems that are less structured than the ones that multi-arm bandit problems 
examine. Decisions about new products or processes, new business strategies, or new 
organizational forms and designs that are often attributed to a recombination of existing 
resources, technologies, or design elements (Fleming, 2001; Denrell et al., 2003; Lippman 
and Rumelt, 2003) are examples of such problems.  NK models differ from the bandit 
problems in three important ways. First, unlike bandit problems, the NK models do not 
assume that the set of possible actions is given and known by the agent. That is, the 
representation of the task environment does not include all possible actions. Second, actions 
that differ in payoffs are not equally spaced from one another. Third, in choice situations with 
multiple pay-off relevant elements, the best option on one element often depends on choices 
made about other elements.  In other words, there is interdependence between different choice 
elements.   
 
The NK model was originally developed in evolutionary biology (Wright, 1932; Kauffman 
and Weinberger, 1989; Kauffman, 1993). Levinthal (1997) introduced the model to the 
organizations and management literature to study the interrelationship between adaptation and 
selection of organizational forms. The model takes its name from the two key parameters of 
the model that establish the task environment: The N parameter of the model represents the 
performance-relevant choice elements, while K is a parameter influencing the 
interdependencies among these elements.  
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An everyday example helps to provide the key intuition behind most NK models. Suppose the 
design of a car involves choices about four key design elements (the N in the model): engine 
size, overall shape, placement of trunk and colour. If there are three choices for each design 
element than the space of actions contains 3 X 3 X 3X 3=81 points, each of which has an 
associated performance level (this could be willingness to pay for an average car buyer). If 
the best choice on each of these parameters is independent of the other element choices (e.g. 
the best colour does not depend on the shape being chosen), then the performance landscape 
has a single global peak. In modelling terms, this means that there are no interdependencies 
and K is therefore 0. Even an extremely myopic search process, which never looks beyond 
points in the immediate proximity of the current point, eventually finds this peak. Once we 
find the best colour, for instance, we can hold that constant; find the best shape and so on, 
sampling at most 12 points in this systematic manner.  
 
However, if the best choice on one element depends on what has been chosen for the others – 
the best colour actually does depend on the shape, which in turn depends on engine size and 
so on, then the performance landscape will now have many points that are local peaks; they 
are better than all their neighbouring points but not necessarily the best in the design space 
overall. The K parameter regulates the degree of interdependencies and the higher the K, the 
more local peaks and the more “rugged” is the design space. One will now need to sample 
many more points and there may be no guarantee of finding the best point, unless all 81 
points are sampled.  Worse, a myopic search process that only looks at points in the proximity 
of the current point (local search) will often get “stuck” on a local peak.  The key difference 
between the two situations lies in the existence of slopes; in the first case the slopes point 
infallibly to the global peak (no interdependence, K = 0), but not in the second case 
(interdependence, K > 0).   
 
The NK model has found wide applicability in organizational research, because many 
managerial problems such as new product development, process innovation and 
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organizational routines, strategy formulation, or the design of organizational forms, activity 
systems, and HRM systems appear to share a common structure: In all of these tasks, 
managers must make choices over many elements that jointly and interdependently contribute 
to overall performance, much as the design features in our car example do. In the following, 
we outline how the NK model depicts the task environment, the agent’s representation of the 
task environment, the choice process, and the transformation of representations and choices 
over time.   
 
1.  Task Environment:   
The NK model depicts a complex combinatorial task (Kauffman & Weinberger, 1989). The N 
parameter captures the number of performance-relevant task elements. For example, N could 
represent product features, resources and capabilities, or distinct elements of a business policy. 
A conventional simplifying assumption is that these elements are usually binary – they are 
either present (1) or absent (0). To pick up on the car example above, the task of designing a 
car could be described as choosing the car body configuration (hatchback or sedan), the 
colour (black or white), and the engine type (internal combustion or electric motor). Each 
possible action in this task environment is a configuration or combination of these elements 
and the entire space of actions then contains 2N combinations with distinct performance 
consequences. For example, with N = 3, the entire task environments consists of 8 distinct 
combinations, each associated with a unique binary string (e.g., [101], representing a sedan (1) 
with black colour (0) and an electric motor (1)). Combinations represent alternative product 
designs differing in features. Product [111] and product [000] offer radically different features, 
while product [110] is more similar to the first product, differing in only a single element.  To 
ease exposition we will refer to a combination of choices such as [111] as a “policy” 
alternative, or in brief a policy. A policy thus represents an action in the task environment, 
and can be thought of as the equivalent to an arm in a multi-armed bandit model.     
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The NK model offers considerable flexibility so that task environments with varying levels of 
interdependence between its elements can be represented. This is achieved through a 
computational algorithm for the construction of the performance functions or “fitness 
landscapes”; the mapping of policy alternatives onto performance values that accounts for 
interdependencies among its elements. This provides the researcher with a simple way to vary 
the complexity of the task environment (Simon, 1962) or problem difficulty (Page, 1996). 
Specifically, parameter K regulates the level of interdependencies among task elements in the 
payoff function. The payoff contribution of each element ei in a policy is affected by both the 
state of the element itself and the states of K other elements. Payoff contributions for 
elements are drawn from a (usually uniform) probability distribution and the performance of 
the entire policy alternative is then simply the average of all payoff contributions. For 
example, with K = 1, payoff contribution of the car body also depends on the engine type- 
indicating interactions between these choices – large engines mean car bodies with less 
passenger room, etc.  
 
Generally, with higher values of K, there are more local peaks and performance differences 
among neighbouring policy alternatives, differing only in a single element, become more 
pronounced (Kauffman, 1993; Rivkin, 2000).  This gives the landscape the property of 
ruggedness, with lots of peaks and surrounding valleys.  
In many NK models, the interdependency structure is often randomly determined- any K 
other elements may influence the payoff contribution of a choice.  Alternatively, the modeller 
may also choose to impose (by assumption) a specific structure on the task environment if the 
purpose of the analysis is to study the implications of these differences. For instance, the 
consequences of the degree of task decomposability or its hierarchical properties can be 
explored in this way (e.g. Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007; 
Ghemawat and Levinthal, 2008).  
 
2. Representation:  
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As with any model of bounded rationality, the NK models assumes that agents do not have 
accurate representations of their task environment. Given the complexity and structure of the 
Task Environment, a crucial assumption in the application of the NK model to  organizational 
and management  problems is that an agent only constructs a limited representation of a small 
subset of the 2N possible combinations and their associated outcomes at any point in time. 
Usually this subset is generated through a search process defined in terms of the 
neighbourhood of the status quo alternative.  Thus, the agent’s representation does not include 
a full listing of all possible policy alternatives and their associated payoffs. For instance, the 
designer of the automobile is assumed to not know the payoffs associated with all possible 
combinations of design choices (such as black, sedan, medium engine, big trunk etc.).    
 
In the majority of organizational NK models the agent only represents at any point in time the 
current policy and a randomly selected proximate policy (which differs from current policy in 
one element) , and the associated performance outcomes of these two policies. For example, 
the car designer may consider a car configuration that changes the colour from white to black, 
while keeping other elements constant. Thus the agent’s representation at any point in time 
may be thought of as consisting of },{ ,1,1 tt aa −  and a corresponding },{ ,1,1 tt −ππ , where 
these are the current policy alternative (location) and a randomly selected one-step neighbour 
of the current policy, and their associated payoffs (which are accurately known). The 
determination of the payoff of the neighbouring policy combination is often assumed to occur 
in an (un-modelled) “offline” process, which one may imagine features either an experiment 
within a “model” of the problem held by the agent, or an experiment that the agent actually 
undertakes but which can be reversed. 
 
There are some important exceptions to local search. For instance, one may allow for more 
“distant” search or long jumps where multiple elements are changed at the same time (Cyert 
and March, 1963: 170; Levinthal, 1997). In models with long jumps (e.g. Levinthal, 1997), 
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the representations may thus (also) include a randomly selected non-proximate combination 
and an accurate associated payoff.  For instance, the car designer may consider changing both 
the colour and the engine type, while keeping the car body as it is. Gavetti and Levinthal 
(2000) offer a depiction of agent’s representations of a landscape in which the agent has an 
initial coarse but unbiased representation of the landscape – they do not know the associated 
payoff for every combination of elements (i.e. policy alternative), but they can see aggregate 
payoffs for clusters of combinations of elements. To illustrate, the car designer might broadly 
understand that streamlined shapes and red colour seem to do better when put together, but 
not the various ways in which shape and colour interact with other elements (such as engine 
size, trunk size, weight).  
 
Relatedly, the representation could be inaccurate, as the associated payoff of the policy may 
not reflect their true payoffs. Knudsen and Levinthal (2007) model a search process where the 
associated payoffs in the representation may be subject to evaluation errors. The agent 
generates a local alternative to the status quo, and the evaluation of its performance is subject 
to an error function to capture the “screening” ability of the agent, with less able agents 
making more mistakes in judging the payoff of an alternative. This may lead to adoption of 
inferior alternatives in the search process.    
 
More competent, less boundedly rational decision-makers might be modelled as having 
knowledge of more than one proximate policy and their associated outcomes in addition to 
the current policy in their representation. For instance, in the organizational models developed 
by Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003; 2005; 2006) a more competent manager has a greater 
number of policy alternatives in mind. This captures the degree of bounded rationality, i.e., a 
more competent manager develops and evaluates a greater number of policy alternatives. 
 
In sum, Representations of agents in NK models vary in terms of scope (how many and which 
policy alternatives are in it at any point in time) and accuracy (whether the associated payoffs 
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are known and valid). However, it is important to emphasize that the notion of representation 
is fairly limited in the NK model, because agents do not actively learn about interactions 
among choice elements to guide search in the task environment, and represent only a very 
small portion of the task environment at any point in time      
 
3. Choice process 
The choice process is usually assumed to follow a maximizing choice rule, selecting the 
policy with the best payoff in the representation.  As we have noted, this representation may 
or may not be accurate, depending on whether evaluation errors occur (e.g. Knudsen and 
Levinthal, 2007). 
 
4. Transformation procedure:   
The set of alternatives in the agent’s representation is modified through a process of 
recombinant search (Fleming, 2001), involving the sampling of new alternative policies by 
recombining individual elements. The baseline assumption here is the notion of local 
neighbourhood search – agents seek new alternatives in close proximity to and anchored on 
the status quo. This is because local alternatives are easier to evaluate for boundedly rational 
decision-makers. More distant search which involves changing multiple policy elements at 
the same time may also be allowed for. The relative frequency of these types of search, and 
their triggers are often the key features studied in NK models. 
 
There is learning in the NK models, because agents change their representations and hence 
actions as a consequence of previous actions taken and payoffs achieved. However, unlike  
reinforcement learning in which agents obey the Law of Effect, in NK models agents learn 
based on the principle of (Local)Hill Climbing - where they always search for improvements 
relative to their current situation, often in their immediate neighbourhood (Levinthal, 1997).    
 
Behavioral plausibility of NK models 
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While individual behavior has been extensively studied in experimental work on human 
problem solving (c.f., Newell and Simon, 1972; Kotovsky et al., 1985; Langley et al., 2014), 
these investigations have generally been restricted to problems that have clearly defined goals 
and the agents know when these have been accomplished.  In contrast, the NK model assumes 
that the solution – the global optimum – is not known- neither its location nor its value (c.f. 
Selten, 2001).  This leads to two key behavioral assumptions of the NK model of individual 
agent adaptation - local search and exploratory choice.  
 
Experimental studies by Busemeyer et al. (1986) and Busemeyer and Myung (1987) on 
resource allocation tasks with interdependencies found strong evidence for local hill-climbing 
behavior in both studies. Further, participants tend to select a similar direction in allocating 
resources if performance increased, while failure induced search in a new direction. Billinger, 
Stieglitz and Schumacher (2014) studied search behavior in NK task environments with 
various levels of complexity. They found strong evidence for the primacy of local search. Yet, 
they also found evidence for a form of adaptive, problemistic search: Individuals gradually 
search more distant, exploratory alternatives as a response to poor performance. These results 
suggest that the search for new alternatives may indeed be sensitive to performance feedback, 
as much of the empirical research in the organizational learning literature has assumed (Greve, 
2003), but which is a notion that has not been explored to any great depth in the NK 
modelling literature. The studies also showed that the search process does not seem to 
produce a deep understanding of the overall landscape, as is implicitly assumed in the 
principle of local search.   
 
Finally, the broader experimental evidence (not based on NK tasks) also supports the idea of 
local search. There is evidence that (1) the starting point matters because it defines the region 
in which people will begin searching  (2) the more favourable the initial feedback  is the more 
localized  search becomes, such that the region of search  becomes smaller, and finally that (3) 
local search reduces the region in which new experiences are sampled, and this prevents the 
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decision maker from reaching their optimal preference point (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 
2003; Hoeffler, Ariely, & West, 2006; Klayman and Ha, 1987). 
 
Gavetti et al. (2012) note in their recent review of the literature that  there is extensive 
evidence that organizational change is triggered by performance feedback and that low 
performance stimulates search (also see Greve, 1998; 2003).  We have already noted the 
significant empirical literature on organizational ambidexterity, and the evidence it produces 
for explorative behavior at the organizational level. However, there is limited direct evidence 
of the local nature of organizational search and the conditions under which it becomes less 
local (e.g. Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Fleming and Sorenson 2004; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001).   
 
In sum, the key behavioral assumptions of the NK model of individual agent adaptation- 
namely local search and exploratory choice appear to rest on good empirical foundations. 
However, the experimental and empirical literature also finds to a larger extent than assumed 
in the models that search is adaptive and guided by performance feedback. The results here 
speak in favour of the notion of problemistic search as proposed by Simon (1955), Cyert and 
March (1963), and Greve (2003), and suggest that NK models could take on this property as a 
modelling feature    
 
Key trade-offs and insights 
After examining behavioral plausibility we now discuss the trade-offs and insights from the 
NK model that we believe offer promising avenues for empirical research.   
 
It is well known that finding the global optimum on an NK landscape is “NP hard” (Rivkin, 
2000) which essentially means that it is impossible for a decision-maker to actively try out all 
possible configurations.  For example, the problem of designing cars obviously entails many 
more elements than just deciding on car body, colour, and engine type. Thus organizational 
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scholars are most interested in the search process that unfolds in NK landscapes as well the 
extent to which agents in the model succeed at finding better choices. The major results from 
models of search in NK landscapes centre on the question of how properties of the Task 
Environment – in particular the ruggedness of the performance landscape – impact the 
effectiveness and outcomes of various search procedures. In a simple landscape with no 
interdependence between choices (K = 0) local search inevitably leads all agents to the global 
optimum. For rugged landscapes with multiple local peaks (K > 0) agents facing the same 
task environment are likely to end up at different local optima (which may differ in 
performance properties). The initial Representation (i.e. the starting location) influences 
where in the landscape an agent searches locally for performance improvements.  This leads 
to  strong path-dependency in the subsequent search process and the associated 
Transformation of the initial Representation. Because of these path-dependencies, 
heterogeneity in policies and in performance emerges as stable outcomes in rugged 
landscapes (Levinthal, 1997). 
 
A central challenge for boundedly rational agents in rugged NK landscapes is therefore to 
prevent getting stuck on a low-performing local optimum and to increase the likelihood of 
identifying the global optimum. The models in the literature have identified two broad 
conditions to achieve this. First, an agent must be able to broaden search beyond the 
immediate neighbourhood of an existing alternative (e.g., develop more elaborate 
representations that go beyond the neighbourhood, in order to avoid trapping on local peaks). 
Second, the agent needs to be able to stabilize search around a better-performing alternative in 
choice selection. Readers will recognize that in essence, this is a version of the exploration-
exploitation trade-off that was introduced in our discussion of bandit models. In both the NK 
and multi-armed bandit, exploration  refers to a process of seeking alternatives that are not 
indicated by the current representation, though the manner in which the task environment and 
its representation are modelled are of course very different.   
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Figure 3 offers a stylized representation of this trade-off in an NK model. Early in the search 
process, local search rapidly increases performance from the starting position, because the 
task environment typically offers some refinement potential. However, over time, local search 
exhausts refinement potential as agents get stuck on local peaks. Further performance 
improvements based on local search are then no longer possible. In contrast, an adaptive 
search rule that triggers gradually more distant search as a response to failure and reverts back 
to local search after success (Billinger et al. 2014) improves performance more slowly, but 
tends to outperform in the long run as distant search helps agents to move off low-performing 
local peaks.    
 
 
Figure 3: Performance of local and adaptive search in complex task environments 
 
The modelling literature has explored several individual and organizational attributes that 
may help to stimulate adaptive search. Indeed, it may be fair to say that the philosophy behind 
most of the models in this tradition has been to take particular organizational features (or their 
consequences) and translate them into behaviorally plausible search processes that break free 
of local hill climbing, such as analogical reasoning – in which solutions that have worked in 
one domain are transplanted to another (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, Rivkin and 
Levinthal, 2005); divide and conquer heuristics in which a problem is broken down into 
smaller sub-problems, on the assumption that each can be solved in isolation (Ethiraj and 
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Levinthal, 2004); and means-end analysis, in which one works backwards from the desired 
result to current best action (Denrell, Fang and Levinthal, 2004). 
 
 For instance, Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) show that simple, low dimensional 
Representations – limited knowledge about the rugged performance landscape – help agents 
to identify more attractive starting positions for further local search. In Rivkin and 
Siggelkow’s (2003) model, less boundedly rational managers have better representations of 
the task environment in the neighbourhood of the current policy. Knudsen and Levinthal 
(2007) propose an approach in which agents evaluate a new policy in the neighbourhood with 
error and thereby sometimes adopt a lower-performing action. This allows them to move off 
low-performing peaks. This is beneficial in rugged landscapes. However, errors in the 
selection of actions should not be too large, since agents may then be incapable of holding on 
to superior choices. 
 
As with the multi-armed bandit model, the insights from the NK model for the designers of 
learning systems, including organizations can be inferred from this central trade-off between 
local and non-local search. When entering poorly understood complex task environments, the 
parameters of the search process determine success. In particular, avoiding being trapped by 
local peaks with low payoffs, while also avoiding falling off peaks with good payoffs, is 
critical. The models suggest that organizational processes that support analogical reasoning, 
the use of divide and conquer heuristics, and sampling practices in surrounding environments, 
produce this balance and therefore offer advantages in the search process. These ideas can and 
should be empirically tested.  
 
We turn next to models of mutual adjustment. 
 
2. Models of Mutual adjustment  
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Models of mutual adjustment between agents capture important organizational phenomena 
such as inter-unit or inter-agent collaboration, socialization and knowledge exchange, 
imitation, and delegation and control. In fact, any organizational process in which multiple 
agents influence each other’s adaptation processes would qualify as a candidate to be 
analysed using models of mutual adjustment.  For instance, managers of different product 
divisions within a company seeking to realize synergies by coordinating their marketing 
campaigns; teams of engineers developing different sub-systems; new employees adjusting to 
an organization’s culture and vice versa. Organizational models of mutual adjustment either 
explicitly or implicitly build on models of individual adaptation. Many recent models of 
mutual adjustment in organizations have relied on either NK or multi-armed bandit models to 
capture individual agent behavior, but also using some form of mutual adjustment 
assumptions between multiple agents.  
 
In each of these models, two or more interacting agents jointly face either a bandit or an NK 
task; therefore the discussion of Representations, Choice and Transformation processes from 
the family of individual agent adaptation models carries over exactly here (and we do not 
repeat those). The key difference lies in the nature of the Task Environment that each agent 
faces, which now includes the other agent(s)- possibly without the focal agent being aware of 
this.     
 
The discussion of behavioral plausibility of mutual adjustment models is also largely the same 
as in individual adaptation models, with the important exception of the task environment, 
which as noted above now includes the other agent(s). The social psychological evidence 
shows that we treat risky interactions with nature differently than we do interactions with 
other people, implying that social risk is different from non-social risk (Bohnet and 
Zeckerhauser, 2004; Blount, 1995). However, without exception, the mutual adaptation 
models that we review below assume that the agents act exactly as they would in a task 
environment in which they were alone.  
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There are two justifications for this. First from a modelling point of view, it is plausible that 
the overall learning or search process of an agent is the same regardless of whether their 
interaction is with Nature or another agent, but the parameters of the search process may 
change.  For instance, agents may explore less, learn more slowly or search more locally 
when they know there are other agents mutually adjusting to them, but the basic processes of 
local search and reinforcement learning would not change.  Second, one may interpret the 
model as pertaining to situations of such task environment complexity as to render the agent 
effectively incapable of meaningfully recognizing the existence of other agents (for instance 
if there are a large number of other agents one cannot easily communicate with). As Simon 
(1990) famously remarked, the task environment and the agent’s internal processes work 
jointly like the blades of a scissor to produce observable behavior. Above certain levels of 
environmental complexity, the agents’ behavior, whatever the internal processes, may look 
the same as it does in simpler contexts.  
 
Besides the inclusion of other agents, there are other secondary variations in the task 
environments (namely interdependence, communication and imitation possibilities) of these 
models such that it is useful to discuss the key trade-offs and results from models of coupled 
learning/search, social learning, and imitation separately within this model family.  
 
i. Key insights from coupled learning/ search models 
One important class of mutual adjustment  models, which we call “coupled learning/search 
models”, assumes that agents are engaged in a search for combinations of good 
interdependent choices, but do so under communication constraints, arising from 
specialization, spatial distance, concerns about alignment of interests, etc. Communication 
constraints are a critical element of these models. Absent such constraints,  coordination of 
search is a trivial problem.  
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On practical grounds these models of mutual adjustment are equivalent to models of 
individual adaptation in a task environment that just so happens to include another agent (but 
the focal agent typically doesn’t really “know” this).  The feedback each agent sees in any 
given time period is thus partly dependent on the other agent’s (unobserved) actions, resulting 
in the possibility of learning inappropriate lessons from feedback. Thus, the challenge for the 
agents is to coordinate their search processes, in a multi-period situation with feedback in 
every period, given interdependence and communication constraints.  
 
Lounamaa and March (1987) presented an early model that explicitly examines mutual 
adjustment processes in search and learning, and pointed to the hazards of rapid learning 
(similar to that discussed in the section on bandit models of individual adaptation). Lave and 
March (1975) also reported the hazards of rapid learning in matching coordination games and 
offer similar explanations (i.e., superstitious learning- in which agents learn inappropriately 
from false negatives and false positives.  
 
Puranam and Swamy (Forthcoming) used a coupled multi-armed bandit model (i.e., the 
payoff to each agent from selecting an arm also depends on what arm the other agent has 
selected) to show that even incorrect initial Representations of the Task environment held by 
both agents may be better than representations that do not discriminate at all between the 
alternative choices. This is because the latter are more likely to generate “false negatives”- 
suppose the first agent takes the correct action accidentally, but if the second agent does not, 
the feedback on joint actions indicates a failure, which causes the first agent to also discard 
their own correct choice. This effect grows stronger as the learning rates of agent’s increase 
(as the agents learn more rapidly from feedback that includes false negatives), and weaker as 
the communication between the agents improves (so that they recognize a false negative as 
such). Knudsen and Srikanth (2014) developed this line of argument further by showing that 
coupled learning processes needs to balance efforts at reducing mutual confusion by aligning 
Representation of the Task Environment (and thereby restricting exploration) and at reducing 
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joint myopia by slower learning or reduced knowledge transfer (and thus promoting 
exploration). These results are a manifestation of the trade-off reported in Figure 2 for the 
multi-armed bandit model. 
 
Lee and Puranam (Forthcoming) model coupled learning in a hierarchy, in which a 
superior defines strategy and a subordinate implements it. The superior thus has a 
view on which arm to choose in a bandit task, transmits this view to a subordinate, 
who then selects the arm but with some probability of error (i.e. imprecise 
implementation). The superior then revises beliefs based on observed outcomes, 
without knowing the actual action chosen by the subordinate.  The central insight in 
their model is that given this separation between belief (superior’s) and action 
(subordinate’s), effective implementation by the subordinate has benefits beyond the 
well-known effect of enabling exploitation of good strategies. Curtailing exploration 
by the subordinate paradoxically enables the discovery of better strategies by the 
organization, as it allows more effective learning from feedback on the value of 
current strategies. It therefore makes sense, the authors argue, to insist on precise 
implementation of strategies in organizational hierarchies even when their validity is 
unknown.    
 
Rivkin and Siggelkow have studied coupled search processes on rugged landscapes using the 
NK model, with agents engaged in local search (2003; 2005; 2006). They find that 
mechanisms that cause interdependent agents to take each other’s payoffs into account (such 
as broad, inter-unit incentives) prevent one agent from taking actions that harm the 
performance of the other; but interestingly the absence of such instruments can help prevent 
premature settlement of the dyad onto a local peak. Siggelkow and Rivkin (2009) extended 
the analysis to a particular form of a hierarchical coupled learning problem, where higher 
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level choices partially constrain lower level choices, to show that such a coupled search 
process can obscure the real impact of the higher level choices. Thus the impact of choices 
about the first layer of organizational structure (i.e. divisional vs. functional) may be obscured 
by adaptation at the departmental level. For example, the performance over time of an 
organization depends not only on the higher level structure (e.g. divisional vs functional) but 
also on the manner in which lower level units adapt to their own task environments.  It cannot 
therefore be used purely as a signal of the effectiveness of the former.  
 
In summary, the key insights from this set of models are that in situations of interdependence, 
learning confronts certain unique challenges as well as opportunities. As a consequence, 
certain features of the mutual adjustment process are expected to play a key role in shaping its 
success, such as the rates of learning, the nature of initial beliefs, and the hierarchical 
differences between the agents mutually adjusting to each other. These conjectures can be 
tested empirically.  
 
ii. Key insights from social learning models 
A second class of mutual adjustment models allow for communication between independent 
agents, but focus instead on the rates at which agents learn from each other – in particular 
how they may copy or share their representations of the task environment. The actions of the 
agents themselves are not interdependent in these “social learning” models (Bandura, 1977), 
instead each agents payoff depends on their own action, but since all agents are in the same 
environment, they can learn from the successful actions of other agents. The classic model by 
March (1991) on exploration and exploitation is of this form: agents essentially learn from 
superior, better-performing agents in their Task environment, by copying their actions.  
 
The models of social learning also yield the learning trade-off obtained in the coupled 
learning literature, i.e., moderate rates of individual learning lead to better representations of 
reality. The reasoning is the same, which is that rapid learning can give rise to superstitious 
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learning (while very slow learning may not take advantage of learning opportunities at all). 
This commonality is not surprising given that the key building block for both kinds of models 
is an individual level reinforcement learning process. Subsequent work in this tradition has 
deepened insights around these social learning processes. Miller et al. (2006) and Lazer and 
Friedman (2007) added a social network perspective to the underlying mechanism, with 
individuals only learning from each other if they are socially connected. Fang, Lee and 
Schilling (2010) and Schilling and Fang (2013) developed the social network perspective 
further by showing how subgroup isolation and information distortion enhance exploration in 
organizational learning. Isolated groups with few direct ties between them preserve individual 
variations in representations longer. Isolated groups thereby slow down the learning process, 
leading to more correct representation of the task environment.  Likewise, Information 
distortion generates variation as agents learn from each other and has a similar effect.     
In summary, who one is connected to, and at what rate one learns from others as opposed to 
from one’s own experiences are factors that should shape the effectiveness of learning among 
a community of learners.   
 
iii. Key insights from Imitation/Competitive Learning models 
Finally, several models of mutual adjustments have considered a particular form of social 
learning, which occurs when the interests are not aligned between teacher and learner and 
indeed they may be competing- e.g. the case when laggards in an industry try to imitate the 
leaders. Using the NK model as a framework, the central insight here is that complexity may 
serve as an effective barrier to imitation (Rivkin, 2001; Lenox et al., 2007). Specifically, the 
finding is that partial or imperfect imitation of complex practices (perfect imitation is unlikely 
by definition when complexity is high) may not necessarily improve performance (Rivkin, 
2000).  
 
Csaszar and Siggelkow (2010), on the other hand, demonstrate some value to imitation, albeit 
in low complexity environments.  They do this by pinpointing two distinct mechanisms 
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influencing the value of imitation. First, imitators benefit directly from copying superior 
practices, especially in low-complexity task environments. Second, imitation even of inferior 
practices is also an instrument for dislodging agents from inferior local peaks and thereby 
promotes more distant search. Relatedly, Posen et al. (2013) develop the intriguing insight 
that imperfect imitation may be better than perfect imitation in some situations. Specifically, 
imperfect imitation allows the imitator to preserve and build upon unique and valuable 
practices currently not implemented by superior firms.  
 
A central element of adaptive rationality is the presence of aspirations that determine when 
search and imitation stops. Aspirations of an agent may not just be informed by the individual 
search and learning process –their own historical aspirations (Lant, 1992; Greve, 1998) – but 
they may also be conditioned socially on the performance of others (Festinger, 1954; Greve, 
1998). When aspirations are socially formed, they induce a unique mutual adjustment 
dynamic, since agents that uncover superior alternatives raise the reference point for the entire 
ecology of learners (Levitt and March, 1988; Lant and Mezias, 1992). This can, in turn, 
reignite search and learning by others, thereby creating a self-reinforcing dynamic of mutually 
adjusting aspirations and increasing performance. Thus, competition serves an important role 
in spurring innovation and imitation, not only because it raises the expected returns to search 
(as assumed in traditional rational choice models), but also because the success of others 
raises the aspiration of the focal firm. This is crucial in a task environment in which no one 
may know the upper bound on what is truly achievable (i.e. the height of the global peak is 
unknown).      
 
These results point to possibilities for empirical examination of the effects of complexity on 
competition and innovation.  
 
3. Information Aggregation  
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Like mutual adaptation models, in information aggregation models agents are part of each 
other’s task environments. As a family, these models provide a general framework to 
understand how individual evaluations are aggregated into organizational level outcomes 
(Knudsen & Levinthal 2007; Christensen & Knudsen 2010; Csaszar 2013; Csaszar and 
Eggers, 2013). In the earlier versions of these models, while the agents interact with each 
other, they do not necessarily adapt to each other- their Representations and Choice processes 
typically do not undergo any change over time. Recent papers assume a transformation 
process for changing the agent’s representations and choice processes, qualifying this family 
of models for inclusion in our review of adaptive rationality models.  
 
Individual evaluations of options in these models are opinions about the absolute viability or 
relative attractiveness of alternatives. (If an individual’s evaluation is the final one and not 
subject to appeal, we may call it a decision by the organization).  For instance, when 
individual managers in an organization evaluate projects, investment alternatives, or 
candidates to hire, they are generating evaluations (which may or may not be the final 
decision of the organization, depending on the distribution of decision rights, e.g., is the 
relevant manager the CEO?).  
 
The models we discuss in this section study the impact of different ways in which individual 
evaluations are aggregated into an organizational level decision. These different decision 
architectures are of course a very important part of organizational structure, and so these 
models may be seen as formalizations of the consequences of different organizational 
structures to aggregate evaluations. The models draw on the seminal work of Sah and Stiglitz 
(1985, 1988) and depict decision-makers as holding fallible beliefs about the value of an 
alternative. The emphasis is therefore clearly on the evaluation, rather than the generation of 
alternatives (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007).  
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As with all models of bounded rationality, the representations the agents hold (in this case, 
about what makes an alternative worthy of positive evaluation) may be flawed. In general, 
fallible decision-makers could make two types of errors: They may reject a superior 
alternative (Type I error) or accept an inferior alternative (Type II error). An everyday 
example may help to convey the intuition. Imagine a group of employees who are screening 
credit card applications. Each makes an individual evaluation- should an application be 
accepted or rejected? Each employee individually is fallible, and may make either a Type I or 
a Type II error. But how does the structure of the group influence its aggregate performance? 
In other words, should we get each application seen independently by an employee who 
makes a final decision on it, or should we get an application seen by multiple employees who 
must all agree before it is accepted? These different decision architectures will have very 
different aggregate Type I (reject superior alternative) and Type II (accept inferior alternative) 
error rates.     
 
. A decision architecture consists of a set of rules that influence information flows and 
decision rights in an organization. For example, in a three-member linear hierarchy, a new 
project is first evaluated by a lower-level manager. Only if she accepts the project, it gets 
passed on to a middle manager. Otherwise, the project is rejected and not evaluated further. 
The middle manager, in turn, then also decides to reject it or accept it to send it on to the 
senior manager for final approval. In contrast, in a decentralized polyarchy, all three 
managers would evaluate the project and acceptance by one is sufficient for project approval.  
These building blocks describe a wide range of possible organizational architectures, with 
many hybrid forms such as committee voting falling between the extreme forms of the 
hierarchy (all agents must accept and pass on to the next) and the polyarchy (any agent may 
accept) (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007; Christensen and Knudsen, 2010; Csaszar, 2013; 
Csaszar & Eggers, 2013).  
 
Task Environment: 
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The task environment that each agent faces is one in which alternatives arise typically 
sequentially rather than simultaneously, and in which there are no interdependencies between 
alternatives.  Each agent faces a stream of projects with some associated payoff value. 
Evaluations involve characterizing these into good and bad projects. For example, in 
considering investment projects, a project could be evaluated as worthy of acceptance if it 
offers a positive net present value.   
  
Representation and Choice process: 
In these models, the representation and choice process are combined into a single modelling 
element called a screening function. Decision-makers may differ in their ability to represent 
accurately the relationship between he attributes of the project and its value, denoting 
differences in skills, experience, or talent. This differential ability is usually modelled as a 
screening function. This is a function that gives us the probability of a project being accepted 
as a function of some underlying characteristic. For instance the characteristics could be 
quality, and agents may differ in their ability to correctly assess this.  An ideal screener is one 
who accepts the project with probability=1 if it exceeds the quality threshold, else rejects it. 
Fallible screeners, however, will accept even below threshold quality projects with some 
probability, and reject above threshold quality projects with some probability.   
 
Transformation process: 
In many models, the screening function of an agent remains constant over time. Christensen 
and Knudsen (2013) introduced a model in which the screening ability of agents develops as a 
function of the decision architecture they are in. Agents are assumed to learn from the 
alternatives that they evaluate. The assumption here is that alternatives represent learning 
opportunities and that more experience translates into a higher screening ability.  
 
Behavioral plausibility 
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Models of information aggregation make few psychological assumptions besides the idea that 
individual evaluations are often imperfect because of bounded rationality, but may improve 
with experience.  This assumption appears to have strong empirical support (c.f., Kahneman 
and Klein, 2009).  The central behavioral idea here is that agents identify and learn about 
relationships between objectively identifiable project cues and the associated value of 
incoming projects. For example, the default risk of a credit application by a company is 
associated with certain cues (such as current profitability, growth, investments etc.). The 
behavioral research shows that learning leads to improved screening ability when the 
relationship between cues and project value are stable, when feedback is rapid and 
unequivocal (i.e., less noisy), and when opportunities exist for prolonged practice with a 
similar set of projects (Osman, 2010; 2014; Newell and Shanks, 2014).  
 
Key trade-offs and insights  
The models provide many insights into how different aggregation structures convert 
individual evaluations into organizational decisions.  
 
Figure 4 offers a stylized depiction of the core result from this class of models. Acceptance 
probability, here, is a function of the project value: a perfect evaluator would reject all 
projects with a value below zero and accept all projects with a value above zero. A single 
agent with imperfect screening ability is depicted as a straight line with a positive slope, 
indicating that there is a positive probability of rejecting (accepting) good (bad) projects.   
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Figure 4: Individual ability and information aggregation in the polyarchy and the 
hierarchy 
 
In a hierarchy, every agent has to accept an alternative for the entire organization to adopt it. 
This lowers the probability of accepting bad projects and minimizes Type II error, but this 
way of aggregating beliefs comes at the costs of a higher rate of Type I errors. In contrast, the 
acceptance of an alternative by a single agent is all that is required for its adoption in a 
polyarchy. This results in a higher rate of Type II errors and less Type I errors. Put differently, 
the polyarchy in the aggregate is more explorative and less risk-averse than the hierarchy 
(Csaszar, 2012; 2013).   
 
Csaszar and Eggers (2013) extended the information aggregation perspective by also 
considering how delegation, majority voting, and the averaging of opinions impact 
information aggregation and the decision-making quality. They show that delegation is the 
most effective structure when there is diversity of expertise, when accurate delegation is 
possible (i.e., when it is known who has the expertise), and when there is a good fit between 
the firm’s knowledge and the knowledge required by the environment. In other words, 
trusting the expert is a good option under the very restrictive conditions identified above. 
Otherwise, voting or averaging may be the most effective structure. This result formalizes and 
specifies the notion of wisdom of crowds (Surowiecki, 2005).   
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Christensen and Knudsen’s (2013) model with transforming screening functions allows 
agents to learn from experience and get better at screening. The basic model structure is 
further enriched by allowing agents not only to accept or reject an alternative, but also to pass 
on an alternative when they do not feel confident about their own judgment. These advances 
therefore mix problems of mutual adjustment and information aggregation to get a richer 
understanding of organizational decision-making over time. A key insight is that if an agent 
only sees projects already screened by others based on his current location in the decision 
architecture, her screening function may transform over time to one which would be 
inappropriate if she were placed elsewhere in the structure.  
 
4. Linkages between Empirical Analysis and Models 
In this section, we conclude by summarizing and discussing the linkages between empirical 
analysis and models. These occur in two directions. First, there is the linkage between 
modelling assumptions and the evidence on actual adaptive behavior by individuals and 
organizations. Second, there is the linkage between model generated results and testable 
empirical implications  
 
i. The behavioral plausibility of modelling assumptions 
For each model family, we examined the structure of the models in terms of four common 
elements, the Task Environment, Representations, Choice processes, and Transformation (of 
Representation) processes- with the goal of understanding to what extent the assumptions in 
these models are consistent with the evidence about how individuals and organizations 
behave. Our review paid close attention to the key behavioral assumptions in these models of 
adaptive rationality, and these may be summarized as follows: 
a) Complexity of the Task Environment to a point where the agent’s Representations are 
necessarily incomplete/incorrect; as a consequence agents may not represent the 
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entire search space, or possess knowledge about the payoffs associated with actions, 
or be aware of the existence and actions of other agents that shape their own Task 
Environments, or see the true value of alternatives. As we have noted, this 
assumption has more to do with the translation of an empirical context appropriately 
into a model; certainly there are organizational contexts where these assumptions are 
highly plausible, and others where they are less so.     
 
The remaining assumptions pertain to individual psychology or organizational behavior 
relating to the nature of adaptive rationality: 
b) Exploration in choice: Choice processes within the Representation stray from pure 
exploitation (i.e. maximization or greedy action selection) and feature a degree of 
exploration.  
c) Problemistic search to modify representations– search and exploration is triggered by 
performance falling below aspiration levels.  
d) Local hill climbing to modify representation:  the discovery of new alternatives 
occurs primarily through the principle of local improvements; (a relaxation of this 
tendency and the willingness to engage in distant search may be interpreted as a form 
of exploration).   
e)  Reinforcement learning to modify representations:  the discovery of the associated 
values for known alternatives occurs through the Law of Effect- alternatives with 
better than expected outcomes are more likely to be tried again, those with worse than 
expected outcomes are less likely to be tried again.  
 
The good news for researchers in the organizational sciences, modelers and otherwise, is that 
the evidence for these assumptions at both the individual and organizational level is in general 
supportive. We have documented the empirical evidence, both experimental and non-
experimental, that gives credibility to these assumptions in the relevant sections where we 
discussed each model. 
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To be sure, there are places where the evidentiary base is stronger than others, and much 
replication is necessary before these assumptions can be safely granted the status of axioms. 
For instance, individual level evidence on problemistic search, and organizational level 
evidence of hill-climbing behavior both can be strengthened. It is still largely a mystery as to 
when both individuals and organizations display broadly similar (though certainly not 
identical) adaptive search and learning behavior, and when they do not since it is apparent 
that the strong unitary actor (e.g. the heroic CEO with fully centralized decision powers) is 
such a rarity.  
 
The aggregation processes within organizations that produce broad similarity across scales 
still need to be carefully investigated, and is a fascinating research agenda in itself.8 As we 
will note below, scholars interested in this particular research question can draw on work 
done in social psychology and organizational behavior that has compared group versus 
individual decisions.    
 
But in answer to the first question that motivated this review- namely are the assumptions that 
underlie models of bounded rationality in organizations behaviorally plausible?-  we must 
answer, with cautious optimism, in the affirmative. The behavioral plausibility of modelling 
assumptions could serve as an encouragement for researchers to put in effort at further 
refining tests of behavioral regularities so that modellers can strengthen and make more 
precise the assumptions in their models. Likewise, empirical researchers in organization 
science, we suggest, should be receptive to at least engaging with these models as sources of 
testable predictions.       
 
                                  
8
 We mean similarity beyond that induced by the language of description. For instance, if we want to 
compare individual and organizational screening functions, we must look for similarities beyond those 
generic to any screening function.     
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ii. The empirical implications of model results 
If organizational models of (adaptive) bounded rationality fare well in terms of their use of 
behaviorally plausible assumptions, we should be optimistic that their predictions find 
empirical support. Yet surprisingly, attempts to empirically test the predictions of these 
models have been rather limited. In part this may be because of the subtlety involved in 
interpreting the results of such a test, even if conducted. To elaborate on this, we consider two 
kinds of tests.  
 
First, when we test the implications drawn from, say a multi-armed bandit or an NK model of 
individual adaptation, we are testing the predictions resulting from the interaction between a 
Task Environment with certain assumed properties, and a set of behavioral rules (captured in 
the nature of Representations, Choice processes and Transformation process). These are of 
course the famous twin blades of Simon’s scissors- the environment and the agent’s internal 
processes jointly produce observable behavior (Simon, 1956; 1990). However since the latter 
(behavioral rules) were drawn from an existing evidentiary base, the test is first of all about 
the former (i.e. assumptions made about the task environment), and whether these correspond 
to the empirical context being used to test the model predictions.  
 
Further, one may also test if variations in the parameters of the search or learning process 
produce expected results when coupled with particular properties of the task environment. 
Laboratory experiments, where one can carefully construct environments, appear to be a good 
method to test model predictions.  To be useful and correspond to real world problems, these 
laboratory based studies could be combined with carefully constructed case studies (c.f., 
Edmondson & McManus, 2007 about the utility of mixed methods in fields that are neither 
very mature nor very new).   
  
Second, when the Task Environment includes other agents (in models of mutual adjustment 
and information aggregation), then our tests of model predictions are implicitly testing if the 
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environments are indeed such as to cause agents in them to be unable to distinguish other 
agents immersed in the same environment from the environment itself. Put simply, we are 
testing the assumption that the agents behave non-strategically with respect to each other in 
the task environment of interest, since that is what the behavioral rules assume in the models 
of mutual adjustment and information aggregation. The limited data that examines differences 
in agent behavior when interacting with human actors compared to non-humans (e.g., games 
where human agents play with a machine or with nature) suggests that this assumption is not 
valid in all task environments (e.g., Blount, 1995; Bohnet & Zeckerhauser, 2004).  
Confronting the predictions of these models with such empirical data may lead to a 
recognition that the behavioral rules used by individuals in simple task environments that they 
recognize as containing other agents (e.g. Blume, Duffy, Franco, 2009) may be different from 
more complex situations or in which the other agents fade, as it were, into the task 
environment (Osman and Ananiadis-Basias, 2013).  The empirical literature is somewhat 
limited in that the task environment faced by decision makers has hitherto not been very 
complex. It is not clear that the observed difference will generalize to very complex 
environments.  Thus, how much iterative reasoning about other’s intentions is both plausible 
(and tractable) will then be a key issue for modelers and empiricists to consider together, by 
varying task environments systematically.           
  
With these observations in mind, we outline the broad contours of the kinds of empirical tests 
one could conduct (and are indeed being conducted) of the results from the existing models. 
We outline the correspondence between model parameters and phenomena in naturally 
occurring data, and these are also summarized in Table 1.   
 
----- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
iii. Suggestions for empirical studies 
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For models of individual adaptation based on multi-armed bandits, the key properties of the 
task environment are noise and changes in feedback conditions. The key behavioral 
parameters of the learning process are the extent of exploration and the rate of learning. 
Empirical tests could thus, for example, involve comparing differences in performance 
between adaptive agents (individuals or organizations) in task environments with varying 
rates of changes or degrees of noise in feedback (e.g. industries or investment opportunities 
with varying levels of environmental change or noise in performance feedback) as a function 
of the agent’s tendencies to make choices other than the past successful ones (i.e. exploratory 
choices) and responsiveness to feedback (i.e. learning rates).  
 
The key property of the task environment in NK models is the interdependency parameter K, 
which creates ruggedness in the performance landscape. The search parameters of interest are 
those that affect the balance between making exploratory “leaps” on the landscape instead of 
local hill climbing. Thus, tests of these models would require us to exploit variations in task 
environments in terms of their interdependence structure (e.g., highly decomposable task 
environments, such as the production of software, vs. less decomposable ones such as the 
development of an advertising campaign), along with variations in properties of the decision-
making agent that would lead to more or less adherence to local hill climbing behavior.  
 
A few studies have already been conducted that offer support for the predictions from the NK 
model. Using patent data, Fleming and Sorenson (2001) found that high levels of technical 
interdependencies reduce the usefulness of inventive efforts (i.e., tracking model results that 
show that exploitation is not a useful strategy in complex environments). In a related study, 
Fleming and Sorenson (2004) showed that investments in basic science are particularly 
valuable in technological fields with high interdependencies. In such task environments, local 
search quickly traps inventors on local peaks. Science provides a cognitive representation 
(Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) of the technological search space and thereby helps inventors to 
identify more attractive regions in the landscape. Lenox, Rockart, and Lewin (2010) used 
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survey data to directly test their own model that enriches the basic NK setup with 
oligopolistic competition among organizations (Lenox, Rockart, Lewin, 2006). They found 
that average profitability is highest with moderate interdependency, and that the dispersion 
and skewness of profits is especially pronounced with high levels of interdependencies. These 
contributions provide empirical support for NK model predictions about how complexity 
affects managerial and organizational behavior and performance outcomes.         
 
Models of mutual adjustment through coupled learning based on the multiple-armed bandit or 
the NK framework create an organization comprising multiple agents. The search process of 
this organization depends on the variance in the parameters of the following features of its 
internal structure: the nature of reward interdependence between the agents, their relative 
rates of learning or exploration, degree of heterogeneity of its networks, and the distribution 
of decision rights between them. These structural features of organizations are observable. By 
jointly examining these attributes as well as variations in the noise and interdependence in 
task environments, the model predictions can be empirically tested. Social learning models, 
through their increasing use of network structure as a key feature of the models, also point to 
an obvious empirical testing strategy: to link network structure to innovation and knowledge 
heterogeneity across agents (Fang et al., 2010). Models of imitative/competitive learning 
make the structure of the task environment a key feature of the models, and so lend 
themselves to empirical testing by examining the heterogeneity of agent’s stable sets of 
choices as a function of the interdependence in their task environments (Csaszar and 
Siggelkow, 2010).      
 
In models of information aggregation, the key aspects of the task environment pertain to the 
rate of arrival and value of projects to be evaluated. Organization design theories have built 
extensive typologies of environmental conditions such as turbulence and munificence that 
capture such variations (e.g., Aldrich, 1979; Dess and Beard, 1984; McCarthy et al. 2010).  
These typologies and the instruments used to measure variance on these dimensions can be 
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used to empirically verify model predictions about how rate of arrival of projects and the 
value of projects to be evaluated lead to particular decisions of organizations.  Also, the 
aggregation structures that combine individual evaluations (the key element of these models) 
are related to the distribution of decision rights in organizations- as visible in authority 
hierarchies and committees.  Measuring differences in authority hierarchies and committees 
and combining them with differences in environmental munificence and turbulence can be 
and indeed has been one method used to test predictions derived from information 
aggregation models (c.f., Csaszar, 2012; Reitzig and Maciejovsky, 2014).    
    
An alternative to looking for naturally occurring data is to set up experiments in the 
behavioral laboratory9 to test predictions. As we noted at the outset of the review, there is a 
natural complementarity between modeling and experimental work in that they both deal 
with interaction structures among a small number of agents, in carefully controlled task 
environments (Billinger et al, 2014; Reitzig and Maciejovsky, 2014). Experiments thus 
provide a very direct test of the predictions emerging from models, as indeed has been 
discovered to their great advantage by researchers in behavioral game theory (Camerer, 
2003).  
 
To make our idea about complementarity concrete, we consider some possible 
experimental paradigms that may be useful starting points (if not destinations) on such a 
journey.  
 
As we have outlined, the m-armed bandit and the NK landscape are two basic model 
families that have been used to understand adaptation by unitary decision makers.  
                                  
9 Field experiments would be even stronger if feasible to set up in a way to allow for precise tests of 
mechanisms (e.g. Bloom et al. 2013).  
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Fortunately experimental tasks exist that correspond quite closely to the task environments 
of these models. The IOWA gambling task (Bechara et al., 1997) is one such example.  
 
Bandit tasks and the IOWA gambling task share similar structural properties. Both present 
decision-makers with a fixed number of choice alternatives, and in both each choice 
alternative have a fixed rate of reward which is unknown to the decision maker. From trial 
to trial the decision-maker receives information (outcome feedback and/or reward 
information) from their choice between the alternatives, and their job is to reliably select 
sequentially from the alternatives so that they maximize their rewards. The appeal of bandit 
tasks, and by extension variants of the IOWA gambling task, is that they lend themselves 
very well to examining both psychological phenomena (such as risk taking, impulsivity, 
and exploration behavior) and modelling including a determination of what is optimal 
behavior in different choice environments. This laboratory task has many features which 
can be carefully manipulated (e.g., payoff structure, feedback, framing, training length, 
cost of information search, and time pressures) that allow researchers to understand the 
types of strategies that individuals develop while exploring and then exploiting their 
environment.  
 
As outlined above, the NK model has emerged as a primary modelling approach to study 
complex management problems such as new product development (e.g.  Almirall and 
Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Claussen et al., 2014), organization design (e.g. Rivkin and 
Siggelkow, 2003), and strategy making (e.g. Gavetti et al., 2005). It may also be a useful 
experimental platform to study search, learning, and decision-making in complex task 
environments. Busemeyer et al. (1986) used a simple resource allocation task in which 
participants have to divide up a fixed number of resources among distinct alternatives 
(such as allocating time to research and teaching). This task can be made more or less 
complex by allowing for payoff interactions among the alternatives. The resource 
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allocation task thereby shares some common features with the NK model, because 
experimental researchers can vary the number of alternatives (equivalent to the N 
parameter in NK models) and the presence of interaction (K parameter) and can be used to 
study predictions from NK models. Billinger et al. (2014) proposed an experimental 
product design task building directly on the NK model. Participants, in their experimental 
setup, must design a product by (re-) combining various attributes and then receive 
performance feedback about specific combinations. The task allows for the easy 
manipulation of, for example, the number of design elements (the N parameter in the NK 
model), interactions among them (the K parameter), different reward structures, or the 
information available to participants (e.g. prior knowledge about the task environment such 
as specific interactions among elements or the payoff of the global optimum, information 
about the designs and current performance of other participants etc.). These experimental 
tasks may allow for the detailed study of how human decision-makers grapple with 
complex problems in various settings such as new product development, process 
improvements, or the discovery and modification of new organization designs or business 
models. Likewise, getting a better understanding how individuals and groups search, learn, 
and choose in complex situations might lead to a refinement of existing formal models and 
theories.      
  
Experimental tests for the aggregation models can take their inspiration from research that 
uses games to investigate how groups differ from individuals as decision making units. There 
are many elegant demonstrations of differences between groups and individuals using 
classical economic games such as the prisoner’s dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede 
and principal-agent games (Kugler et al, 2012; Wildschut et al, 2003). In the prisoner’s 
dilemma game (PDG) two players choose between a cooperative and a non-cooperative 
option, and the combination of choices both players make have different payoffs. In adapted 
versions a unitary decision to cooperate or defect is made by a group, which can be compared 
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with decisions made by individuals. Wildschut et al (2003) and others since have shown that 
groups are more competitive than individuals in the PDG. Ways of amplifying and 
attenuating this discontinuity effect have been connected to key factors associated with group 
dynamics (e.g., strong conflicts of interest, distributed responsibility of decisions taken, 
relaxed attitudes to violations of norms of fairness, level of communication).  Moreover, 
when looking across studies comparing groups with individuals in economics tasks the 
emerging pattern seems to be that groups make unitary decisions that are closer to rational in 
game theoretical terms (Kugler et al, 2012; Maciejovsky et al., 2013). Using tasks such as the 
PDG to look at aggregation issues is extremely valuable, because it is a simple starting point 
from which to examine different aggregation structures, such as consensus, voting, or 
hierarchy in order to compare how groups using these rules act, and if there are any 
predictable differences to how individuals do so.  Another approach is to use the group versus 
individual method used in the PDG with experiments that use paradigms developed to test 
behaviors in NK environments.  Some emerging research in this area examines how groups 
differ from individuals on local versus distant search. Using the experimental NK task, 
Billinger et al. (2015) examined how two-person teams search for performance improvements 
in rugged landscapes. They find that teams search less locally and perform better than 
individuals in identical tasks.   
 
A second, and as yet largely uncharted area of exploration is to construct task 
environments that allow the study of mutual adjustment processes. Experimental tasks in 
which pairs (or more numbers) of agents take interdependent actions and adjust to 
feedback are of course staple in social psychology and behavioral game theory (e.g., Roth 
and Murnighan, 1978; Murnighan and Roth, 1983); however tasks that map closely to 
bandit or NK models are yet to be constructed. In sum, we can think of the space of 
opportunities here along these two dimensions: 1) Individual vs. multi-agent decision 
making entity and 2) Adjustment to environment vs. adjustment to another decision 
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making entity (i.e., mutual adjustment).  The quadrant that involves groups interacting with 
groups is sparse at this point, but is perhaps the closest to inter-organizational phenomena 
of interest such as competition and collaboration.  
 
 
A challenge that organizational scientists may face in relying on experiments is the skepticism 
that readers and reviewers may display about whether interactions between small numbers of 
agents (often two) may have anything to say about “real” organizations, as opposed to say 
“merely” teams, dyads or groups.  (This is in addition to the usual concerns about external 
validity that are justifiably flagged with any experimental work). A thorough consideration of 
the issue is more than we can provide in this paper, but we will note the following: a review 
of the most influential definitions of organization reveals certain commonly occurring criteria 
for an entity to be considered an organization, such as the existence of goals whose attainment 
depends on the efforts of multiple agents, but the number of agents (beyond the “more than 
one” requirement) is never among these criteria (Puranam, Alexy, Reitzig, 2014).  In our view, 
there is no basis (besides convention) on which one can say that a three-person firm is an 
organization but a four-person team is not; to the extent these are goal directed multi-agent 
systems, they are both organizations, albeit solving their problems of division of labor and 
integration of effort in different ways (also see Raveendran, Puranam and Warglien, 
Forthcoming).   
 
There are of course important and completely legitimate questions to be addressed on whether 
the manner in which a three-person organization works is the same as an n-person 
organization (scaling), or whether the behavior of the system changes when each agent is 
itself an organization (recursion). However, we believe we can make a start at answering 
them by taking the first steps into the lab, possibly guided by intuitions derived from models. 
The prospect for fruitful collaborations between experimental researchers and modelers in 
advancing organization science seems bright.         
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5. Conclusions 
We began the paper by suggesting that the literature on adaptively rational models of 
organizations based on Simon’s (1916-2001) pioneering work on bounded rationality was 
deserving of critical examination on account of its central  claim that it is based on  ‘correct’ 
behavioral assumptions.  We also suggested that the extensive research in this tradition has 
generated many precise insights that could be empirically tested.  To facilitate this 
examination and provide organizational scholars with a tractable typology of models we 
classified and examined model families.  Specifically, we reviewed three important families 
of models of adaptive rationality in organizations- individual adaptation, mutual adaptation, 
and information aggregation. These do not exhaust the model families prevalent in 
organizations research, but represent conceptually important and influential ones. And finally, 
we discussed opportunities for research that strengthen the links between formal modelling in 
organizations research, and its behavioral foundations.  
 
Our review suggests that the adaptively rational models are based on empirically validated 
behavioral assumptions in the main.  We have identified a few assumptions that bear further 
testing.  We have also identified the key insights and predictions generated by different 
models and provided information about the empirical tests (albeit limited) of these predictions.  
Finally, we discussed opportunities for future research and outlined how empirical tests can 
be constructed to take advantage of these opportunities. 
 
Our hope is that this review will facilitate greater dialogue between modelers and empiricists 
and that organizational theories and empirical studies will attain greater precision and provide 
better predictions as a result. 
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Table 1: Summary of model families 
 
 
Model  
Task 
environment 
Representation 
of task 
environment  
Choice process Transformation Key trade-offs Key insights 
Models of individual adaptation 
Bandit 
model 
Actions are 
discrete 
alternatives with 
uncertain and 
unknown  
outcomes 
 
Key parameters: 
Noise and change 
in payoff (e.g. 
some investment 
opportunities 
produce clear 
signals of value, 
others do not) 
Subjective beliefs 
about outcomes  
(e.g. 
discriminative 
between choices, 
and bias of 
representation) 
Probabilistic 
choice based on 
representation 
 
 
Key parameter: 
Propensity to 
explore by taking 
actions other than 
those currently 
believed to be best 
(e.g. deviation 
from past 
successful actions, 
novelty seeking) 
Reinforcement 
learning to update 
representation 
 
Key parameter: 
Responsiveness to 
feedback (e.g. 
incentives for 
success and 
failure)   
Exploitation of 
current representation 
versus exploration to 
update representation 
 
Learning without 
being misled by 
positive and negative 
feedback  
Value of exploration 
(Sutton & Barto, 1998) 
 
Dangers of learning too 
rapidly from noisy 
feedback 
(Denrell, 2005; Posen 
& Levinthal, 2012)  
 
Hot stove effect 
(Denrell & March, 
2001) 
 
Risk aversion as an 
outcome of learning 
(March, 1996) 
NK model Actions are 
complex 
combinatorial 
alternatives with 
certain but 
unknown  
outcomes 
 
Key parameter: 
Interdependence 
between choice 
elements (e.g.  
decomposability 
of design space or 
value chain)   
Limited 
representation of 
available 
alternatives and of 
structure of task 
environment 
 
Key parameters: 
Quality of initial 
representation 
(e.g. coarseness, 
discrimination 
among choices, 
and bias of 
representation) 
Maximizing 
choice with 
potentially  
imperfect 
evaluation  
 
Key parameter: 
Errors in 
evaluation (e.g. 
experience or 
expertise of 
evaluating agent) 
Recombinant 
search to create 
and test new 
alternatives 
 
 
Key parameter: 
Propensity to 
change many 
elements at a time 
(e.g. 
uncoordinated 
search with 
specialists vs. 
coordinated 
search, political 
deadlocks leading 
to local search)   
Local versus distant 
search 
 
Perfect versus 
imperfect alternative 
evaluation 
 
Value of combining 
local and distant search 
(Levinthal, 1997; 
Siggelkow & Levinthal, 
2003) 
 
Efficacy of cognitive 
search (Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000) 
 
Value of imperfect 
evaluation for 
exploration (Knudsen 
& Levinthal, 2007)  
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34
35
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39
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41
42
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Models of mutual adjustment 
Coupled 
learning/ 
search 
models 
 
Outcomes of 
alternatives 
depends on the 
choices of other 
agents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draws on models of individual 
adaptation 
Agents take  
actions that are 
interdependent, 
adapt to feedback 
 
Key (additional) 
parameters: 
Reward 
interdependence 
between agents, 
relative rates of 
learning, initial 
representations, 
communication 
constraints, 
distribution of 
decision rights  
Slow versus rapid 
learning from own 
choices in updating 
representations  
 
Coordination versus 
exploration  
Value of slow learning 
(Lounamaa & March, 
1987) 
 
Benefits of incorrect 
representations 
(Puranam & Swamy, 
2014) 
Social 
learning 
Presence of other 
agents in a 
collaborative 
setting  
Key (additional) 
parameters: 
Connectivity to 
other agents, 
relative rates of 
learning 
Slow versus rapid 
learning from choices 
of other agents  
Value of weak ties 
(Miller et al., 2006; 
Fang et al. 2009) and 
information distortion 
(Schilling & Fang, 
2012) to preserve slow 
learning 
Imitation / 
Competitive 
Learning 
Presence of other 
agents in a 
competitive 
setting 
Agents update 
representations by 
observing the 
choices of others 
in a competitive 
setting 
 
Key (additional) 
parameters: 
Observability, 
imitation breadth 
Imitation versus 
innovation  
Complexity as imitation 
barrier (Rivkin, 2000; 
2001) 
 
Imitation to reignite 
exploration (Csaszar & 
Siggelkow, 2010) 
 
Value of imperfect 
imitation (Posen et al., 
2013) 
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36
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45
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50
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55
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Models of information aggregation 
Decision 
structures 
Actions 
correspond to 
projects to be 
selected 
 
Key parameters: 
Rate of flow and 
outcomes of 
alternatives 
Decision-makers 
differ in ability to 
evaluate outcomes 
of alternatives 
 
Key parameters: 
Experience and 
expertise in 
alternative 
evaluation 
Maximizing 
choice with 
imperfect 
evaluation 
 
 
Key parameters: 
Experience and 
expertise in 
alternative 
evaluation (note 
representation and 
choice are 
combined in these 
models) 
Updating based 
on reinforcement 
learning 
 
 
Key parameter: 
Responsiveness to 
feedback (e.g. 
incentives for 
performance) 
Type I (rejection of 
superior alternative) 
versus Type II error 
(acceptance of 
inferior alternative) 
Design of reliable 
decision structures 
(Christensen & 
Knudsen, 2010) 
 
Decision structures and 
exploration (Knudsen 
& Levinthal, 2007; 
Csaszar, 2012) 
 
Limits to majority 
voting and averaging of 
opinions (Csaszar & 
Eggers, 2012) 
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